Limitation Periods in Civil Litigation
Learning Objectives
By the end of this topic, you should be able to:
- Explain the purpose of limitation law and the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt (the law assists the vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights).
- State the effect of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 — the mandatory dismissal of time-barred suits, even if limitation is not pleaded.
- Distinguish provisions that extend time (Section 5 condonation), exclude time (Sections 12, 14), and restart time (Sections 18, 19).
- Apply the rules on legal disability (Sections 6–8) and fraud or mistake (Section 17).
- Recall the most examined Schedule articles — 3 years for contracts (Art. 55) and the residuary (Art. 113), 12 years for possession (Art. 65) and execution (Art. 136), 30/90 days for appeals.
- Explain why limitation "bars the remedy but not the right," and the crucial exception in Section 27 (adverse possession).
Quick Answer
Limitation law fixes deadlines for going to court. Under the Limitation Act, 1963, every suit, appeal, or application must be filed within the period prescribed in its Schedule; Section 3 commands the court to dismiss a time-barred proceeding even if the defendant never raises the point. The Act then softens this rigour: Section 5 lets courts condone delay in appeals and applications (not suits) for "sufficient cause"; Sections 12 and 14 exclude certain periods from counting; Sections 18–19 restart the clock on a written acknowledgment or part payment of a debt; Sections 6–8 protect minors and persons of unsound mind; Section 17 postpones limitation where fraud or mistake concealed the claim. The core idea: stale claims breed stale evidence, so the law forces the vigilant to sue in time — barring the remedy, though (except under Section 27) not the underlying right.
Overview
Why should a perfectly good claim die just because the plaintiff waited too long? Three reasons drive limitation law: evidence decays (witnesses forget, documents vanish), certainty matters (people must be able to arrange affairs without indefinite threat of litigation), and vigilance deserves reward — vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt.
The Limitation Act, 1963 is a complete code on time-bars for civil proceedings. Its structure:
- Sections 3–11: the bar of limitation, condonation of delay, and disability.
- Sections 12–24: computation — what time is excluded, and what events restart the clock.
- Sections 25–27: acquisition of easements and extinguishment of rights (adverse possession).
- The Schedule: 137 Articles prescribing periods for specific suits (Arts. 1–113), appeals (Arts. 114–117), and applications (Arts. 118–137).
The CPC and the Limitation Act work in tandem: the CPC tells you how to litigate; the Limitation Act tells you by when. Note also that special statutes (e.g., the Consumer Protection Act, arbitration law) often carry their own limitation rules, which Section 29(2) coordinates with the general Act.
Core Concepts
1. The Bar of Limitation (Section 3)
Definition: Section 3 provides that every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.
Explanation: This is a mandatory, jurisdiction-like command to the court, not a favour to the defendant. The court must examine limitation on its own motion; parties cannot waive it or confer validity on a stale claim by consent. What Section 3 bars is the judicial remedy — the underlying right generally survives (so a time-barred debt can still support a valid part payment, or be set off against the creditor in limited ways), with the major exception of Section 27.
Example: A lends B ₹1 lakh repayable on 1 January 2020. Article 55/19-type money claims carry three years. A sues on 1 March 2023 — two months late. Even if B never mentions limitation, the court must dismiss the suit.
Real-World Example: In Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha (AIR 1992 SC 1815), the bank adjusted a time-barred debt against a guarantor's fixed deposit. The Supreme Court upheld it: limitation had barred the remedy of a suit, but the debt itself — the right — subsisted, so the bank's recourse to the security was lawful.
Why It Matters: For practitioners, limitation is the first point checked in every brief; a missed deadline is professional negligence. For exams, Section 3's mandatory character and the remedy/right distinction are perennial questions.
Common Misunderstanding: That the defendant must plead limitation for it to apply. Wrong — Section 3 obliges the court to act suo motu. Contrast this with most defences, which are lost if not pleaded.
2. Condonation of Delay (Section 5)
Definition: Section 5 empowers courts to admit an appeal or application (not a suit, and not an execution application under Order XXI CPC) after the prescribed period if the applicant shows "sufficient cause" for not filing in time.
Explanation: Limitation for suits is absolute; for appeals and applications, the Act trusts judicial discretion. "Sufficient cause" is elastic — illness, wrong legal advice given in good faith, delay in obtaining certified copies — and courts ask whether the explanation is bona fide, not whether it is flawless. The length of delay matters less than the quality of the explanation, but negligence, inaction, or mala fides defeat the plea.
Example: X's appeal is due within 90 days of the decree. X is hospitalised for the final month and files 20 days late with medical records. The court condones the delay under Section 5 and hears the appeal.
Real-World Example: In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji (AIR 1987 SC 1353), the Supreme Court laid down the liberal approach: substantial justice should be preferred over technical defeat, every day's delay need not be explained with mathematical precision, and the State (a slow-moving litigant) deserves some latitude. Counterpoint: Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer ((2013) 14 SCC 81) reminds courts that "sufficient cause" cannot rescue sheer negligence — liberality is not licence.
Why It Matters: Section 5 applications are among the commonest interlocutory battles in Indian courts; knowing the Katiji principles (and their limits) is essential courtroom equipment.
Common Misunderstanding: That Section 5 can save a late suit. It cannot — by its own terms it applies only to appeals and applications. A plaintiff who misses limitation for a suit has no condonation remedy; only computation provisions (Sections 12–24) can help.
3. Legal Disability (Sections 6–8)
Definition: Where a person entitled to sue is, at the time the limitation period would begin, a minor, of unsound mind, or an idiot (the statute's term), Section 6 allows the suit to be filed within the same period after the disability ceases.
Explanation: Limitation presupposes an ability to act; the law will not punish those legally incapable of suing. Section 7 handles disability among several claimants; Section 8 caps the indulgence — no extension beyond three years from cessation of the disability for the situations it covers, and the sections apply to suits and execution applications, not appeals. Note the disability must exist when limitation would start; a disability arising later does not stop a clock already running (Section 9: once time begins to run, no subsequent disability stops it).
Example: Property belonging to a 10-year-old is wrongfully occupied. The 12-year period under Article 65 does not defeat the child; on attaining majority at 18, the fresh computation rules in Sections 6 and 8 govern the outer time to sue.
Real-World Example: In Darshan Singh v. Gurdev Singh (AIR 1995 SC 75), the Supreme Court applied Sections 6 and 8 to a minor's suit, holding that the extension is available only within Section 8's three-year outer ceiling after majority — illustrating that disability protection is real but bounded.
Why It Matters: Problem questions love disability facts ("the plaintiff was 14 when the cause of action arose..."). The examiner wants Sections 6, 8, and 9 applied together.
Common Misunderstanding: That limitation simply "does not run" against minors. Time may well be running in a formal sense; the correct statement is that the disabled person gets a fresh (but capped) window after the disability ends, and an intervening disability never stops a clock already started (Section 9).
4. Computation: Exclusions and Postponements (Sections 12, 14, 17)
Definition: Computation provisions determine what time does not count: Section 12 excludes the day the cause arose and time spent obtaining certified copies of the judgment/decree for appeals; Section 14 excludes time spent prosecuting, in good faith, a civil proceeding in a court that lacked jurisdiction; Section 17 postpones the start of limitation where the claim is based on fraud or mistake, or where documents were fraudulently concealed — time runs only from discovery (actual or with reasonable diligence).
Explanation: These sections keep limitation fair. Section 12 recognises you cannot appeal without the decree copy; Section 14 protects the diligent-but-mistaken litigant who sued in the wrong forum; Section 17 stops fraudsters from running out the clock on their own concealment. Add Section 4 (if the period expires on a day the court is closed, filing on reopening is in time) and Section 15 (exclusion of time when an injunction or statutory notice period intervened).
Example: P sues D in a court that, after two years of proceedings, is held to lack territorial jurisdiction and returns the plaint. P refiles in the proper court. Section 14 excludes those two years from the limitation count, provided P acted in good faith and with due diligence.
Real-World Example: In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department ((2008) 7 SCC 169), the Supreme Court applied Section 14 to arbitration proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, holding the exclusion available even where Section 5 condonation is not — showing how computation provisions can rescue litigants that discretion cannot.
Why It Matters: Real limitation problems are rarely about the bare period; they are about what time counts. Mastering Sections 4, 12, 14, 15, and 17 turns an apparent bar into a live claim — the core skill of limitation practice.
Common Misunderstanding: Confusing exclusion (Sections 12/14 — carve time out of the count) with condonation (Section 5 — forgive time that does count). Exclusion is a matter of right if conditions are met; condonation is discretionary.
5. Fresh Start: Acknowledgment and Part Payment (Sections 18–19)
Definition: Section 18: a written, signed acknowledgment of liability made before the limitation period expires starts a fresh limitation period from the date of acknowledgment. Section 19: a payment on account of a debt, or of interest on a legacy, made before expiry (with the payment appearing in the payer's handwriting or a signed writing) likewise restarts limitation.
Explanation: The theory: if the defendant himself admits the liability is alive, the reasons for limitation (stale evidence, settled expectations) fall away. The acknowledgment need not promise to pay or even quantify the debt — an admission of subsisting jural relationship suffices — but it must be made before expiry; a time-barred debt cannot be revived by acknowledgment (though under Section 25(3) of the Contract Act, a fresh written signed promise to pay a time-barred debt creates a new enforceable contract).
Example: B owes A money, limitation expiring 1 June 2023. On 1 March 2023, B emails A a signed letter: "I know the ₹2 lakh is outstanding; give me time." A fresh three-year period runs from 1 March 2023.
Real-World Example: Balance-sheet entries acknowledging a debt have been treated as Section 18 acknowledgments — a point of enormous consequence under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, settled in Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. v. Bishal Jaiswal ((2021) 6 SCC 366), where the Supreme Court held that entries in a company's balance sheet can extend limitation for creditor claims.
Why It Matters: In commercial recovery practice, hunting for acknowledgments (letters, emails, balance sheets, part payments) is often the difference between a live claim and a dead one.
Common Misunderstanding: That any admission, whenever made, revives a claim. The acknowledgment must be (i) in writing, (ii) signed, and (iii) made before limitation expires. After expiry, only a fresh promise under Section 25(3), Contract Act helps.
6. Key Periods in the Schedule (and Section 27)
Definition: The Schedule prescribes periods article by article. The heavyweights: Article 55 — breach of contract, 3 years; Article 65 — possession of immovable property based on title, 12 years (from when the defendant's possession becomes adverse); Article 113 — residuary, 3 years for any suit with no specific article; Article 136 — execution of a decree, 12 years; Article 137 — residuary for applications, 3 years; appeals — 30 days (to most courts, Art. 116(b)) and 90 days (to High Courts, Art. 116(a)).
Explanation: Most tort compensation claims carry short periods (commonly 1–3 years under Articles 72–91, e.g., one year for defamation). Section 27 is the great exception to "limitation bars only the remedy": when the period for a possession suit expires, the owner's right to the property itself is extinguished — the foundation of adverse possession, by which a trespasser in continuous, open, hostile possession for 12 years defeats the true owner.
Example: T occupies O's plot openly and hostilely from 2010. O sues for possession in 2024 — beyond 12 years. The suit is barred under Article 65, and by Section 27, O's title itself is extinguished; T's possessory title prevails.
Real-World Example: In Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur ((2019) 8 SCC 729), the Supreme Court held that a person who has perfected title by adverse possession can even sue as plaintiff to protect that possession — adverse possession is a sword as well as a shield.
Why It Matters: Knowing the handful of core articles (3–12 year matrix, 30/90-day appeals) answers most exam problems; Section 27 and adverse possession are guaranteed essay material.
Common Misunderstanding: That limitation for an Article 65 possession suit runs from the owner's dispossession in every case. It runs from when the defendant's possession becomes adverse — permissive possession (licensee, tenant holding over with consent) never starts the adverse clock until hostility is asserted to the owner's knowledge.
Visual Learning
How to analyse any limitation problem:
Key Terms
| Term | Definition | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Limitation period | Statutory deadline for instituting a suit, appeal, or application | Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 |
| Section 3 bar | Mandatory dismissal of time-barred proceedings, even unpleaded | Court acts suo motu |
| Sufficient cause | Ground for condoning delay in appeals/applications | Section 5; Mst. Katiji liberal approach |
| Condonation | Discretionary forgiveness of delay | Appeals and applications only — never suits |
| Exclusion of time | Time that does not count in computation | Secs. 12 (copies), 14 (wrong forum), 15 |
| Legal disability | Minority, unsoundness of mind at start of limitation | Secs. 6–8; capped extension |
| Acknowledgment | Signed written admission of liability before expiry — fresh period | Section 18; balance sheets (Bishal Jaiswal) |
| Part payment | Payment of debt/interest before expiry — fresh period | Section 19 |
| Adverse possession | Hostile, open, continuous possession for 12 years defeating title | Art. 65 + Sec. 27; Ravinder Kaur Grewal |
| Section 27 | Extinguishes the right to property after possession suit is barred | Exception to "remedy barred, right survives" |
| Article 113 / 137 | Residuary periods: 3 years for suits / applications | Default when no specific article fits |
| Section 29(2) | Applies the Act's machinery to special/local laws unless excluded | Links Limitation Act to special statutes |
Common Mistakes
Mistake 1: "Limitation is a defence — if the defendant doesn't plead it, the suit survives." Why it's wrong: Section 3 directs the court to dismiss time-barred proceedings whether or not limitation is raised; parties cannot waive limitation or extend it by agreement (Section 28 of the old Act's logic; see also Sec. 3's mandatory language). Correct approach: Treat limitation as a threshold question the court examines suo motu in every case; a plaint disclosing a time-barred claim can even be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.
Mistake 2: "Section 5 lets courts condone delay in filing a suit if the cause is sufficient." Why it's wrong: Section 5 expressly covers only appeals and applications (and excludes Order XXI execution applications). For suits, the period is absolute — the plaintiff's only hope lies in computation provisions (Secs. 4, 12, 14, 15, 17) or fresh-start provisions (Secs. 18–19). Correct approach: First classify the proceeding (suit vs appeal/application), then choose the right rescue provision: condonation for appeals/applications, exclusion/postponement/restart for suits.
Mistake 3: "Limitation extinguishes the right itself in all cases." Why it's wrong: The general rule is the opposite — limitation bars the remedy, leaving the right intact (PNB v. Surendra Prasad Sinha: time-barred debt could still be adjusted against security). Only Section 27, for suits for possession of property, extinguishes the right — producing adverse possession. Correct approach: State the rule (remedy barred, right survives), give the PNB example, then flag Section 27 as the statutory exception and link it to Article 65.
Comparison and Connections
| Mechanism | Provision | What it does | Applies to |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bar | Sec. 3 | Mandatory dismissal after expiry | Suits, appeals, applications |
| Condonation | Sec. 5 | Discretionary forgiveness for sufficient cause | Appeals and applications only |
| Exclusion | Secs. 12, 14, 15 | Removes qualifying time from the count | As per each section |
| Postponement | Sec. 17 | Start deferred until fraud/mistake discovered | Suits and applications based on fraud/mistake |
| Fresh start | Secs. 18, 19 | New full period from acknowledgment/part payment | Any liability, if before expiry |
| Disability | Secs. 6–8 | Fresh window after disability ends (capped) | Suits and execution applications |
| Extinction | Sec. 27 | Kills the right itself (possession suits) | Basis of adverse possession |
| Frequently Confused Pair | The Distinction |
|---|---|
| Limitation vs prescription | Limitation bars the remedy; prescription (e.g., easements under Sec. 25, adverse possession via Sec. 27) creates or extinguishes substantive rights |
| Sec. 18 acknowledgment vs Sec. 25(3) Contract Act promise | Acknowledgment works only before expiry and restarts limitation; a signed written promise to pay a time-barred debt creates a new contract even after expiry |
| Exclusion (Sec. 14) vs condonation (Sec. 5) | Exclusion is arithmetic and available as of right on proof of conditions; condonation is judicial discretion |
Practice Questions
Recall
Q1. State the limitation periods for: (a) a suit for breach of contract, (b) a suit for possession of immovable property based on title, (c) execution of a decree, (d) an appeal to a High Court from a decree. Answer guidance: (a) 3 years — Article 55; (b) 12 years from when possession becomes adverse — Article 65; (c) 12 years — Article 136; (d) 90 days — Article 116(a) (30 days to other courts, Art. 116(b)).
Q2. What does Section 3 of the Limitation Act require, and who must raise the question of limitation? Answer guidance: Every suit/appeal/application filed after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence — the court must consider it on its own motion; parties cannot waive it.
Understanding
Q3. "Limitation bars the remedy but not the right." Explain with one authority and one statutory exception. Answer guidance: The claim becomes judicially unenforceable but the underlying obligation survives — PNB v. Surendra Prasad Sinha (bank could appropriate security for a time-barred debt). Exception: Section 27 extinguishes the right to property itself once a possession suit is barred, enabling adverse possession.
Q4. Why does Section 5 not apply to suits, and what options remain for a plaintiff whose suit period has expired? Answer guidance: Legislative policy treats the (longer) suit periods as absolute to protect defendants' repose; discretion exists only for appeals/applications. A late plaintiff can only invoke computation: Sec. 4 (court closed), 12/14/15 (exclusions), 17 (fraud/mistake postponement), or show a fresh period arose under Secs. 18–19.
Application
Q5. D signs a promissory note on 1 Jan 2019 payable on demand. On 1 Nov 2021 D emails a signed letter admitting the debt. On 1 Mar 2023, D pays ₹5,000 "towards the outstanding" by a signed cheque with a covering note. When does limitation finally expire? Answer guidance: Base period 3 years. The 1 Nov 2021 signed acknowledgment (within time) restarts limitation under Sec. 18 → expiry 1 Nov 2024. The 1 Mar 2023 part payment evidenced in writing restarts it again under Sec. 19 → expiry 1 Mar 2026. Each restart is valid because it occurred before the then-current expiry.
Q6. P sued D for possession in the Court at X in 2015; in 2019 the plaint was returned for want of territorial jurisdiction, and P refiled at Y within a month. D pleads that the 12-year Article 65 period (adverse possession since 2006) expired in 2018. Advise P. Answer guidance: Apply Section 14: the four years spent bona fide and with due diligence prosecuting the same matter in the wrong court are excluded from computation. Excluding 2015–2019, the refiled suit is within 12 years of 2006. Discuss the good-faith and due-diligence conditions and note the plaint-return route (Order VII Rule 10 CPC) fits Section 14's language.
Analysis
Q7. Critically evaluate the liberal approach to condonation in Mst. Katiji against the stricter line in Basawaraj. Can both coexist? Answer guidance: Katiji: substantial justice over technicality, no litigant benefits from delay, State litigants get pragmatic latitude. Basawaraj: sufficient cause is not a charter for negligence; equal treatment demands discipline. Reconcile: liberality applies to the standard of explanation, not to its absence — bona fide, explained delay is condoned; unexplained inaction is not. A strong answer notes the special context of government delay and condonation-of-delay jurisprudence under commercial statutes being stricter.
Q8. Adverse possession rewards a wrongdoer with title. Is Section 27 read with Article 65 defensible? Discuss with reference to Ravinder Kaur Grewal. Answer guidance: Arguments for: certainty of titles, punishing owner neglect, aligning paper title with long social reality, evidence decay. Against: legalised land-grabbing, burden on absent/vulnerable owners; note Law Commission and judicial criticism suggesting reform (e.g., Hemaji Waghaji v. Bhikhabhai, doubting the doctrine's fairness). Ravinder Kaur Grewal strengthens the possessor (title usable as sword). Conclude with a reasoned view — e.g., retain but lengthen the period or require compensation.
FAQ
Q: Can parties agree in a contract to a shorter or longer limitation period? A: No. An agreement curtailing the statutory period is void under Section 28 of the Contract Act, and parties cannot extend limitation by consent either — Section 3 operates regardless. (Contrast clauses that extinguish rights after a period in insurance policies, which courts have treated differently from clauses barring the remedy.)
Q: Does limitation apply to writ petitions under Articles 32 and 226? A: The Limitation Act does not directly govern writs, but courts apply the doctrine of laches — unexplained, prejudicial delay can defeat a writ petition. Courts often use analogous statutory periods as a rough benchmark for what counts as stale.
Q: What happens if the last day of limitation falls on a court holiday? A: Section 4 saves you: filing on the day the court reopens is treated as within time. But Section 4 helps only when the period expires on the closed day — it does not add holiday days falling in the middle of the period.
Q: Is a time-barred debt completely worthless to the creditor? A: Not entirely. The right survives (only the suit remedy is barred), so the creditor may appropriate existing security (PNB v. Surendra Prasad Sinha), receive voluntary payment lawfully, or sue on a fresh signed written promise under Section 25(3) of the Contract Act. What the creditor cannot do is obtain a decree on the barred claim itself.
Q: How does limitation interact with special statutes like the Consumer Protection Act or arbitration law? A: Special laws often prescribe their own periods (e.g., two years for consumer complaints under the CPA, 2019; three months plus 30 days for setting aside awards under Section 34, Arbitration Act). By Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, its machinery (Secs. 4–24) applies to special-law periods unless expressly or impliedly excluded — e.g., Section 5 condonation is excluded beyond Section 34(3)'s 30-day cap, but Section 14 exclusion still applies (Consolidated Engineering).
Quick Revision
- Purpose: evidence decays + repose + vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt.
- Sec. 3: time-barred suit/appeal/application shall be dismissed, even if limitation not pleaded — court acts suo motu; no waiver.
- Rule: limitation bars the remedy, not the right (PNB v. Surendra Prasad Sinha). Exception: Sec. 27 extinguishes title in possession suits → adverse possession (Art. 65, 12 years; Ravinder Kaur Grewal — sword and shield).
- Sec. 5: condonation for "sufficient cause" — appeals/applications only, never suits; liberal approach (Katiji), but not for negligence (Basawaraj).
- Sec. 4: last day court closed → file on reopening. Sec. 12: exclude copy time. Sec. 14: exclude bona fide wrong-forum time. Sec. 17: fraud/mistake — time runs from discovery.
- Secs. 6–8: minority/unsound mind at start → fresh window after cessation, capped (3 years, Sec. 8). Sec. 9: once running, time never stops for later disability.
- Sec. 18: signed written acknowledgment before expiry → fresh period (balance sheets count — Bishal Jaiswal). Sec. 19: part payment in signed writing → fresh period.
- After expiry, only a fresh written signed promise (Sec. 25(3), Contract Act) creates a new enforceable obligation.
- Core periods: contracts/residuary suits 3 yrs (Arts. 55/113); possession & execution 12 yrs (Arts. 65/136); appeals 90 days (HC) / 30 days (others); applications residuary 3 yrs (Art. 137).
- Sec. 29(2): Limitation Act machinery applies to special statutes unless excluded.
Related Topics
Prerequisites
- Introduction to Civil Procedure Law — where limitation fits in the litigation timeline.
- Filing of Suits — institution of suits, the moment limitation tests.
Related Topics
- Court Fees and Costs — Section 149 CPC's relation-back saves limitation on deficit fees.
- Res Judicata — the other great "you cannot litigate this" doctrine, barring re-litigation rather than late litigation.
Next Topics
- Jurisdiction and Venue — wrong-forum filings and Section 14 exclusion.
- Execution of Decrees — the 12-year outer limit under Article 136.
References
[1] Limitation Act, 1963 — Sections 3–9, 12–19, 25–27, 29(2), and the Schedule (Articles 55, 65, 113, 116, 136, 137). [2] Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353. [3] Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81. [4] Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, AIR 1992 SC 1815. [5] Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Dept., (2008) 7 SCC 169. [6] Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. v. Bishal Jaiswal, (2021) 6 SCC 366. [7] Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729. [8] Darshan Singh v. Gurdev Singh, AIR 1995 SC 75. [9] Indian Contract Act, 1872 — Sections 25(3), 28.