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Rights of Women and Children

Legal protections for women and children are among the most actively developed areas of human rights law. Both India and the United States have built substantial frameworks of constitutional provisions, statutes, and case law — though the specific rights and enforcement mechanisms differ significantly.

Learning Objectives​

By the end of this topic, you should be able to:

  • Identify the constitutional provisions in India and the US that form the basis for women's and children's rights
  • Explain the key protections offered by India's PWDVA 2005, POSH Act 2013, POCSO Act 2012, and Maternity Benefit Act 1961
  • Describe the role of Title VII, Title IX, VAWA, and FLSA in protecting women and children in the United States
  • Apply landmark Indian cases (Vishaka 1997, Mary Roy 1986) and US cases (Meritor 1986, Tinker 1969, In re Gault 1967) to fact-pattern problems
  • Compare maternity leave, child labour standards, and domestic violence remedies between India and the US
  • Distinguish intermediate scrutiny (US) from India's approach to sex-based classifications under Article 15
  • Evaluate constitutional versus statutory enforcement approaches for protecting women and children

Quick Answer​

Both India and the US protect women and children through layered constitutional and statutory frameworks. India's Constitution (Articles 14, 15, 16, 21A, 24, 39) forms the backbone, supplemented by specific statutes like the PWDVA 2005, POSH Act 2013, POCSO 2012, and Maternity Benefit Act 1961. The US relies on the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause (applying intermediate scrutiny to sex-based laws), the 19th Amendment (voting rights), and statutes including Title VII, Title IX, VAWA, and FLSA. Landmark cases in both systems have filled gaps that legislation left open, particularly on workplace harassment and juvenile due process rights.

India: Rights of Women​

Constitutional Basis​

India's Constitution provides multiple protections for women:

  • Article 14: Equality before law — no arbitrary distinctions permitted
  • Article 15(1): Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex
  • Article 15(3): Permits special provisions for women and children — the constitutional basis for all protective legislation
  • Article 16: Equal opportunity in public employment
  • Article 39(a): State shall secure adequate means of livelihood for men and women equally
  • Article 42: State shall make provisions for just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief

Article 15(3) is the critical clause: without it, legislation offering special protections to women could be challenged as discriminatory against men. Courts have consistently upheld statutes like the POSH Act and Maternity Benefit Act under this provision.

Key Legislation​

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA)

  • Section 2(a): Defines "domestic violence" broadly — physical, emotional, sexual, and economic abuse
  • Section 18: Protection orders, including restraining orders and residence orders
  • Section 20: Monetary relief including compensation and maintenance
  • The Act covers relationships beyond marriage, including live-in relationships and relationships within a shared household
  • Saroj Rani Kushwaha v. Union of India (2010): Supreme Court held domestic violence extends beyond physical harm to include economic exploitation

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013 (POSH)

  • Implements the Vishaka Guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997)
  • Mandates Internal Complaints Committees (ICC) at every workplace with 10 or more employees
  • Covers formal and informal workplaces; includes domestic workers
  • Local Complaints Committees (LCC) handle complaints from unorganised sector workers

Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (amended 2017)

  • Section 5: Entitles pregnant women employees to 26 weeks of paid maternity leave (increased from 12 weeks in 2017 for the first two children; 12 weeks for third and subsequent children)
  • Applies to establishments with 10 or more employees
  • Section 11A: Mandatory crèche facility for establishments with 50 or more employees
  • Adoptive and commissioning mothers entitled to 12 weeks of maternity benefit

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Section 498A IPC

  • Prohibit demanding or giving dowry
  • Section 498A IPC (cruelty by husband or relatives) is cognizable and non-bailable — frequently invoked in domestic violence cases
  • The Supreme Court has cautioned against misuse while maintaining the provision's importance for genuine victims

Landmark Indian Cases — Women's Rights​

Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997): Following a brutal gang rape of a social worker, the Supreme Court laid down the Vishaka Guidelines on sexual harassment at the workplace — effectively creating law in the absence of legislation. The Court drew directly on CEDAW to justify its intervention. These guidelines were codified in the POSH Act, 2013.

Mary Roy v. State of Kerala (1986): The Supreme Court struck down an antiquated Syrian Christian succession law that gave daughters only a life interest in property, ruling they must receive equal inheritance rights under the Indian Succession Act. This case illustrates how courts can displace personal laws that conflict with constitutional rights.

India: Rights of Children​

Constitutional and Statutory Framework​

  • Article 21A: Right to free and compulsory education for children aged 6–14 (inserted by 86th Amendment, 2002); implemented through the Right to Education Act, 2009
  • Article 24: Prohibition of employment of children below 14 years in factories, mines, or other hazardous work
  • Article 39(e)–(f): State to protect children from exploitation and ensure opportunities for healthy development in conditions of freedom and dignity

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO)

  • Defines and criminalises sexual assault, sexual harassment, and pornography involving children (under 18)
  • Mandates child-friendly procedures in court — evidence recorded in camera, no aggressive cross-examination
  • Establishes Special Courts for speedy trial
  • Section 29: Presumption of guilt on the accused once penetrative sexual assault is established — this reversal of the burden of proof is a notable departure from general criminal law
  • Gender-neutral in its protection: applies to all children regardless of gender

Prohibition of Child Labour (Regulation) Act, 1986 (amended 2016)

  • Prohibits employment of children below 14 years in all occupations and processes
  • Children between 14–18 (adolescents) cannot be employed in hazardous occupations
  • Family businesses and entertainment industry have limited exceptions for child participation, subject to conditions
  • Shyam Lal v. State of Haryana (1999): Factory owner fined for employing a 13-year-old

United States: Rights of Women​

Constitutional Basis​

The 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause is the primary constitutional basis for women's rights. Sex-based classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny — the government must show a substantial interest served by means substantially related to that interest. This is a lower standard than strict scrutiny (applied to race) but higher than rational basis review.

19th Amendment (1920): Prohibits denial of the right to vote on account of sex.

Unlike India, the US Constitution has no express provision permitting special protective legislation for women. The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was never ratified, meaning constitutional protection depends entirely on judicial interpretation of the 14th Amendment.

Key Federal Statutes​

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 1964

  • Prohibits employment discrimination based on sex, race, color, religion, or national origin
  • Covers employers with 15 or more employees
  • Enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
  • Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986): Supreme Court held sexual harassment in the workplace is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII — both quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment are covered
  • Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services (1998): Same-sex sexual harassment is also covered by Title VII

Title IX of the Education Amendments, 1972

"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."

  • Covers all federally funded educational institutions
  • Requires equal opportunities in athletics (Grove City College v. Bell, 1984; restored by Civil Rights Restoration Act, 1987)
  • Addresses sexual harassment and assault on campuses; schools must respond promptly and equitably
  • The 2024 Title IX regulations expanded protections including for LGBTQ+ students and pregnancy

Violence Against Women Act, 1994 (VAWA)

  • Federal law addressing domestic violence, sexual assault, dating violence, and stalking
  • Funds shelters, legal aid, and law enforcement training
  • Creates federal criminal offences for interstate domestic violence
  • United States v. Morrison (2000): Supreme Court struck down VAWA's civil remedy provision as exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause and Section 5 authority, but the criminal provisions and grant programs remain intact

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 2009

  • Each discriminatory paycheck resets the statute of limitations for filing an equal pay discrimination claim
  • Overturned Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire (2007), which had severely limited pay discrimination claims by starting the limitations clock from the date of the original discriminatory pay decision

Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 1978

  • Amends Title VII to clarify that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related conditions is sex discrimination

Landmark US Cases — Women's Rights​

CaseYearHolding
Reed v. Reed1971First case where SCOTUS struck down a law as unconstitutional sex discrimination under Equal Protection
Frontiero v. Richardson1973Sex-based classifications require heightened justification (plurality opinion)
United States v. Virginia (VMI)1996Virginia Military Institute must admit women — sex discrimination requires "exceedingly persuasive justification"
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson1986Workplace sexual harassment is sex discrimination under Title VII
Obergefell v. Hodges2015Same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry under the 14th Amendment

United States: Rights of Children​

Constitutional Protection​

Children have limited but real constitutional rights. Courts balance children's rights against parental authority and the state's parens patriae interest in child welfare. The Constitution contains no express provision on children's rights — all protection derives from judicial interpretation and statute.

  • Tinker v. Des Moines (1969): Students in public schools retain free speech rights — school authorities cannot suppress expression unless it "substantially disrupts" school activities. Students do not "shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate."
  • In re Gault (1967): Juveniles have due process rights in delinquency proceedings, including the right to counsel, notice of charges, and protection against self-incrimination. This case transformed the juvenile justice system from a purely welfare model to one with procedural protections.

Key Federal Statutes — Children​

Fair Labor Standards Act, 1938 (FLSA) — Child Labour Provisions

  • Generally prohibits employment of children under 14
  • Children aged 14–15 may work in non-hazardous jobs with hour restrictions (no more than 3 hours on a school day, 18 hours per school week)
  • Children aged 16–17 may work unlimited hours in non-hazardous jobs
  • Agricultural child labour rules are significantly weaker — children as young as 12 may work in agriculture with parental consent

Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 1974 (CAPTA)

  • Federal framework for child abuse and neglect prevention
  • Requires states to have mandatory reporting laws and child protective services
  • Funds research, training, and prevention programs

Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 1998 (COPPA)

  • Prohibits websites from collecting personal information from children under 13 without verifiable parental consent

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)

  • Children with disabilities have a right to free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment
  • Schools must develop an Individualized Education Program (IEP) for each eligible child

Key Terms​

TermDefinitionRelated Concept
Intermediate scrutinyUS constitutional standard for sex-based laws — government must show a substantial interest served by substantially related meansEqual Protection Clause, 14th Amendment
Vishaka GuidelinesSupreme Court-mandated rules on workplace sexual harassment (1997), later codified in POSH Act 2013CEDAW, POSH Act
Parens patriaeLatin: "parent of the nation" — state authority to protect those unable to protect themselves, including childrenJuvenile justice, child welfare
FAPEFree Appropriate Public Education — the entitlement of children with disabilities under IDEA to receive specialised education at public expenseIDEA, IEP
Section 29 POCSOPresumption of guilt clause — once penetrative sexual assault is established, the burden shifts to the accused to prove innocenceBurden of proof reversal, POCSO 2012
Quid pro quo harassmentHarassment where submission to sexual conduct is made a condition of employment or educational benefitTitle VII, Title IX
PWDVA domestic violencePWDVA 2005 Section 2(a) defines domestic violence broadly to include physical, emotional, sexual, and economic abuseProtection orders, Section 18
Article 15(3)Constitutional clause permitting special provisions for women and children — basis for all protective legislation in IndiaProtective discrimination, positive action
EEOCEqual Employment Opportunity Commission — federal agency that enforces Title VII and other employment discrimination laws in the USTitle VII, administrative enforcement
FMLAFamily and Medical Leave Act — provides 12 weeks of unpaid leave for qualifying family and medical reasons; no federal paid leave mandate exists in the USMaternity leave comparison
Section 498A IPCCriminalises cruelty by husband or his relatives — cognizable and non-bailable offenceDowry Prohibition Act, domestic violence
Article 21ARight to free and compulsory education for children aged 6–14, added by the 86th Constitutional Amendment 2002Right to Education Act 2009

Common Mistakes​

Misconception: Article 15(3) of the Indian Constitution creates a loophole that allows discrimination against men.

Why it's wrong: Article 15(3) does not permit arbitrary gender-based classifications — it permits beneficial special provisions for women and children. The provision is an enabling clause for protective legislation, not a licence for discrimination. Courts apply a purposive interpretation: the measure must genuinely benefit women or children, not simply treat them differently.

Correct understanding: Article 15(3) is constitutionally justified affirmative action. It must be read alongside Article 14 (equality) and Article 15(1) (non-discrimination). The objective is substantive equality — recognising that women and children face structural disadvantages that require targeted remedies.

Misconception: VAWA's civil remedy provision was struck down in Morrison, so VAWA no longer provides any protection to domestic violence victims.

Why it's wrong: United States v. Morrison (2000) struck down only the specific civil remedy provision that allowed victims to sue their abusers in federal court. The criminal provisions creating federal offences for interstate domestic violence, the grant programs funding shelters and legal services, and the law enforcement training programmes all survived intact. VAWA has also been reauthorised several times since 2000.

Correct understanding: VAWA remains a functioning federal law. Morrison narrowed its scope by eliminating the private civil lawsuit mechanism, but the bulk of VAWA's protective framework — including criminal law and federal funding — continues to operate.

Misconception: POCSO Section 29's presumption of guilt means the accused has no defence once the offence is alleged.

Why it's wrong: Section 29 creates a rebuttable presumption, not an irrebuttable one. The presumption is triggered only once the prosecution establishes that an act of penetrative sexual assault was committed — not merely on allegation. The accused can then lead evidence to rebut the presumption. Courts have also insisted on child-friendly procedures while still maintaining basic fairness to the accused.

Correct understanding: Section 29 shifts the burden of proof to the accused after the prosecution establishes the foundational fact of the offence. This is a recognised exception to the general principle of presumption of innocence, justified by the vulnerability of children and the difficulty of obtaining evidence in cases of child sexual abuse.

Comparison and Connections​

This comparison focuses on enforcement mechanisms rather than the substantive rights comparison (which appears in the main content sections).

Enforcement Mechanisms: India vs. US​

Enforcement DimensionIndiaUnited States
Primary enforcement bodyCourts (High Courts and Supreme Court under Art. 226/32); NHRC for human rights violationsEEOC for employment discrimination; DOJ Civil Rights Division; federal courts
Workplace harassment complaintsInternal Complaints Committee (ICC) under POSH Act; then courtEEOC complaint → right-to-sue letter → federal district court
Domestic violence remediesMagistrate court issues protection/residence/monetary orders under PWDVA; civil and criminal routes available simultaneouslyState courts issue restraining orders; VAWA funds federal criminal prosecution for interstate cases
Child protection investigationsChild Welfare Committees (Juvenile Justice Act); POCSO Special CourtsChild Protective Services (state agencies); mandatory reporting under CAPTA; family courts
Constitutional remedyWrit jurisdiction (Art. 32 Supreme Court; Art. 226 High Courts) — directly enforceableSection 1983 civil rights lawsuits; habeas corpus; but qualified immunity doctrine limits police accountability
Time to justiceSignificant delays; fast-track courts for sexual offences partially address thisLitigation timelines variable; EEOC administrative process adds 6–12 months before lawsuit
Class/representative actionsPublic Interest Litigation (PIL) allows any public-spirited person to file on behalf of victimsClass action under Federal Rule 23; more formal standing requirements

Practice Questions​

Recall​

Q1. What are the six constitutional articles in India that form the basis for women's rights? Name them and state what each provides.

Answer guidance: Art. 14 (equality before law), Art. 15(1) (no discrimination on grounds of sex), Art. 15(3) (special provisions for women/children), Art. 16 (equal employment opportunity), Art. 39(a) (livelihood), Art. 42 (maternity relief). A complete answer names all six with brief descriptions.

Q2. What did the Supreme Court hold in In re Gault (1967), and why did it matter for the US juvenile justice system?

Answer guidance: The Court held that juveniles in delinquency proceedings are entitled to due process rights — right to counsel, notice of charges, protection against self-incrimination. Before Gault, juvenile courts operated on a welfare model with few procedural safeguards. The case transformed juvenile justice by applying constitutional protections to young people.

Understanding​

Q3. Explain why India's Maternity Benefit Act (26 weeks paid leave) and the US FMLA (12 weeks unpaid) represent fundamentally different policy choices, not just a quantitative difference.

Answer guidance: The difference is not merely in duration but in nature. India mandates paid leave, placing a direct financial obligation on employers. The US provides only unpaid leave as a baseline, which means lower-income workers often cannot afford to use it. India's model reflects a view of maternity as a social right requiring economic support; the US model prioritises job protection without income guarantee. Neither system is identical — some US states have enacted paid leave laws.

Q4. How does intermediate scrutiny (applied in the US to sex-based laws) differ from the approach Indian courts take to laws that discriminate based on sex?

Answer guidance: In the US, intermediate scrutiny requires the government to show a substantial interest served by substantially related means — less demanding than strict scrutiny for race. In India, sex-based discrimination is facially prohibited by Art. 15(1), but Art. 15(3) carves out an exception for protective legislation. Indian courts ask whether the special provision genuinely benefits women or children; they do not apply a formal three-tier scrutiny framework. The Indian approach is both more permissive (allows special provisions) and in some respects stricter (the prohibition in Art. 15(1) is absolute absent Art. 15(3).

Application​

Q5. Priya, a domestic worker in Delhi, is sexually harassed by her employer. She has no Internal Complaints Committee to approach. What remedies does she have under Indian law?

Answer guidance: The POSH Act 2013 covers domestic workers. Where an employer has fewer than 10 employees (or for unorganised sector workers), the Local Complaints Committee (LCC) — established by the District Officer — has jurisdiction. Priya can file a complaint with the LCC. She can also file an FIR under relevant IPC provisions. The POSH Act Section 14 also protects complainants against retaliation.

Q6. A 15-year-old in the US wants to work 20 hours per week at a fast-food restaurant during the school year. Is this permissible under the FLSA?

Answer guidance: No. The FLSA permits children aged 14–15 to work no more than 18 hours per school week (and no more than 3 hours on a school day). 20 hours exceeds the 18-hour weekly limit. The employer would be in violation of FLSA child labour provisions. The student could work up to 18 hours per school week or up to 40 hours per week when school is not in session.

Analysis​

Q7. In United States v. Morrison (2000), the Supreme Court struck down VAWA's civil remedy provision. Critically analyse whether this ruling was consistent with the purpose of the 14th Amendment.

Answer guidance: The Court held Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the 14th Amendment because the violence was not economic activity and because Section 5 only authorises legislation directed at state action, not private conduct. Critics argue this was formalistic — violence against women has enormous economic consequences, and the 14th Amendment was originally designed to address situations where states failed to protect rights. The ruling reflects the Rehnquist Court's federalism concerns but left a gap in federal protection precisely where state enforcement was most likely to be inadequate.

Q8. Compare the POCSO Act's Section 29 presumption of guilt with the general criminal law principle of presumption of innocence. Is the departure constitutionally justifiable?

Answer guidance: The general principle (also in Art. 20(3) — protection against self-incrimination) holds that the prosecution bears the burden of proof. Section 29 reverses this after the prosecution establishes the foundational offence. Justifications: (a) child victims cannot reliably testify; (b) offenders are often in positions of trust; (c) similar presumptions exist in other laws (dowry deaths under Section 113B Evidence Act). Constitutional challenge: Section 29 is not self-incrimination (Art. 20(3)) because it shifts the burden of proof, not the burden of testifying. Courts have upheld it as a reasonable classification under Art. 14.

FAQ​

Q: Why does the POSH Act require an Internal Complaints Committee rather than just allowing employees to go directly to court?

The ICC model was chosen to provide a faster, more accessible, and less adversarial forum for resolving workplace harassment complaints. Court litigation is expensive, slow, and often involves public proceedings that can deter victims from coming forward. The ICC — which must include an external member from an NGO or women's rights organisation — is required to complete an inquiry within 60 days. However, critics note that ICC members are often appointed by management, raising concerns about independence. The employee always retains the right to pursue criminal remedies alongside the ICC process.

Q: Does VAWA apply only to heterosexual women, or does it cover LGBTQ+ individuals?

VAWA's 2013 reauthorisation explicitly prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in VAWA-funded programs. The 2022 reauthorisation further strengthened these protections. So LGBTQ+ individuals who experience domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking are entitled to access VAWA-funded services and protections. However, the underlying criminal law framework depends on state statutes, which vary considerably.

Q: Can a child below 18 who commits a crime under POCSO also be prosecuted as a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice Act?

This is a genuine tension in Indian law. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015 allows children between 16–18 who commit heinous offences to be tried as adults after an assessment by the Juvenile Justice Board. POCSO offences are often heinous offences. So a child accused of a POCSO offence could be tried either as a juvenile or, if the Board recommends it for 16–18 year olds, as an adult. The assessment includes the child's mental and physical capacity and circumstances of the offence.

Q: Title IX is famous for sports equality, but does it actually require equal funding for men's and women's sports?

Title IX does not require equal dollar spending on men's and women's sports. It requires equal opportunity, which courts assess through a three-part test: (1) whether sports opportunities are proportionate to enrollment ratios; (2) whether the institution has a history of expanding opportunities for the underrepresented sex; or (3) whether the existing program fully accommodates the interests of the underrepresented sex. An institution can comply by meeting any one of these three prongs. Scholarship money must be proportionate, but overall program expenses need not be equal.

Q: Why does India have higher constitutional protection for women through Article 15(3) than the US, where there is no equivalent clause?

The difference reflects the drafting choices of each constitution and the political context of their creation. India's Constitution, written in 1949 by a Constituent Assembly acutely aware of entrenched caste and gender inequalities, explicitly built in tools for affirmative action. Article 15(3) was designed so that protective legislation could never be successfully challenged as discriminatory. In the US, the 14th Amendment (1868) was drafted primarily to address racial inequality after the Civil War, without a parallel enabling clause for women. The ERA, which would have created a constitutional basis for women's equality similar in structure to Article 15(1), was never ratified. As a result, US women's constitutional protection depends entirely on judicial expansion of the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause.

Quick Revision​

  • India: Articles 14, 15(1), 15(3), 16, 39(a), and 42 are the six key constitutional provisions for women's rights
  • Article 15(3) is the enabling clause — it permits special legislation for women and children without violating non-discrimination norms
  • PWDVA 2005 provides civil remedies (protection orders, monetary relief) for domestic violence — covers physical, emotional, sexual, and economic abuse
  • POSH Act 2013 codified the Vishaka Guidelines; requires ICC at workplaces with 10+ employees; LCC covers unorganised sector
  • Maternity Benefit Act 2017 amendment: 26 weeks paid leave for first two children; 12 weeks for third and beyond; crèche mandatory at 50+ employee establishments
  • POCSO 2012 Section 29: rebuttable presumption of guilt on accused once penetrative sexual assault is established
  • US: sex-based laws face intermediate scrutiny (not strict scrutiny) under the 14th Amendment
  • Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986): workplace sexual harassment = sex discrimination under Title VII
  • VAWA 1994: civil remedy struck down in Morrison 2000; criminal provisions and grant programs remain
  • US FMLA provides only 12 weeks unpaid leave — contrast with India's 26 weeks paid leave
  • FLSA: children under 14 generally cannot work; 14–15 year olds limited to 18 hours/week during school year; agriculture exceptions significantly weaker
  • In re Gault (1967): due process rights (counsel, notice, self-incrimination protection) apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings

Prerequisites

  • Constitutional Law: Fundamental Rights (Part III of Indian Constitution)
  • Equality and non-discrimination principles
  • Basics of criminal procedure in India and the US

Related Topics

  • Enforcement of Human Rights (next topic — covers NHRC, Section 1983 lawsuits, EEOC processes)
  • Domestic violence remedies: PWDVA in detail; VAWA grant programs
  • Equal pay legislation: Equal Remuneration Act 1976 (India) vs. Equal Pay Act 1963 and Lilly Ledbetter Act 2009 (US)
  • Child custody, adoption, and juvenile justice

Next Topics

  • Enforcement of Human Rights
  • International Human Rights Treaties (CEDAW, CRC — and why the US has not ratified them)